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infection from February to May followed by two cases in
July 2013 and August 2013, accounting for 135 cases along
with 47 deaths. A second ascent of cases started in October
2013 and surged to 102 cases including 11 deaths, which
have been reported in four provinces of China (Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong), Hong Kong, and one
travel-related case from Taiwan, as of January 24, 2014.
Furthermore, compared to the past year’s peak, the age
distribution in the second wave of cases does not tend to
skew toward the elderly. To formulate appropriate pre-
vention and control strategies for public health, the Taiwan
Centers for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC) assessed the risk
associated with emergence of H7N9 virus and provided
guidance for health care workers and the public. Informa-
tion on characteristics of the H7N9 virus, attributes of the
human population at risk, and epidemiology of the virus
were systematically assessed. An internal expert meeting
was held at Taiwan CDC to evaluate the assessment report.
Viral characteristics
The avian influenza A (H7N9) virus is a novel reassortant
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(HA) and neuraminidase (NA) came from Eurasian avian
influenza lineage.1 Current studies demonstrated
increased binding properties of human H7N9 isolates to
a-2,6 sialic acid, attributed to substitutions Q226L.
However, the major a-2,3 linkage to terminal galactose
limits the ability of human-to-human transmission.2 To
assess human adaptation of the H7N9 virus, we
compared the human isolates from August 2013 onward
with prototype A/Anhui/1/2013 (Table 1).3 The substi-
tution Q226L of HA in the six isolates but lacking G228S
mutations indicated an absence of affinity for human
receptors. In addition, the polymerase 2 protein (PB2)
E627K substitution identified in Taiwan, Guangdong, and
Hong Kong isolates contributed to high polymerase ac-
tivity possibly associated with human adaptation.
Nevertheless, the other important signatures, D701Q in
the PB2, N66S in the PB1-F2, and D92E in the NS1 were
not detected in the recent H7N9 isolates. All the isolates
were sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitor (NI) but
resistant to amantadine attributed to substitution S31N
of M2.4 Currently, NI remains the recommended antiviral
treatment. The human-to-human transmissibility of cur-
rent H7N9 virus remains limited; however, because of
the continually changing nature of influenza viruses,
monitoring of the genetic variations of H7N9 virus is
ongoing.Avian and environmental surveillance
China’s Ministry of Agriculture detected a higher positive
rate of H7N9 virus among birds and in the environmentsAssociation. All rights reserved.
Table 1 Molecular analysis of the H7N9 viruses isolated from August 2013 to January 2014.
Name of viruses Collection date HA NA PB2 PB1-F2 M2 NS1
(yy/mm/dd) 226 228 292 559 570 627 701 66 31 27 67 80 92 111 114 152
A/Anhui/1/2013 2013/03/20 L G R N M K D N N M R S D I S E
A/Guangdong/1/2013 2013/08/10 L G R T I K D N N L R T D V S D
A/Zhejiang/DTID-
ZJU10/2013
2013/10/14 L G R T M E D N N M R S D I S E
A/Zhejiang/22/2013 2013/10/14 L G R T M E D N N M R S D I S E
A/Hong Kong/5942/2013 2013/11/30 L G R T I K D N N L R T D V S D
A/Taiwan/3/2013 2013/12/27 L G R T I K D N N M Q S D I P E
A/Hong Kong/734/2014 2014/01/07 L G R T I K D N N L R T D V S D
Signature substitution Q226L G228S R292K E627K D701Q N66S S31N D92E
H7N9 Z avian influenza A; HA Z hemagglutinin; NA Z neuraminidase; PB2 Z polymerase 2 protein.
398 S.-W. Jian et al.from Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Fujian provinces in
December 2013 and January 2014, when compared to the
survey in the first half of the year 2013.5 Targeted testing of
poultry and the environment in live poultry markets iden-
tified more positive results in areas with human cases of
H7N9 infection. In Taiwan, the Council of Agriculture has
conducted surveillance on wild birds and domestic poultry
since 1998. In 2009 and 2011, there have been seven H7N9
virus-positive samples among migratory birds in Tainan and
Yilan, respectively, which belonged to different phyloge-
netic lineages of H7N9 virus in China.6 No newly emerged
H7N9 virus in the poultry or environment of Taiwan has
been detected during routine serologic and viral surveys. As
H7N9 infection in humans appears to be associated with
exposure to live poultry markets or contaminated environ-
ments, the possibility of acquiring the disease through wild
birds or domestic poultry in Taiwan remains low.
Morbidity and mortality
The H7N9 outbreak in mainland China has a major effect on
public health in Taiwan, particularly because of the severity
and case fatality rate of H7N9 infections in humans. All avian
influenza A (H7N9) vaccines in development are still in the
clinical trial stage. Therefore, no vaccines are currently
available for H7N9 prevention. Because of the increasing
number of passengers traveling between Taiwan and main-
land China, the assessment indicates that additional im-
ported human cases during the Chinese New Year should be
expected. Although more imported cases in Taiwan over the
coming weeks are projected, the current evidence does not
support community or sustained human-to-human trans-
mission of H7N9.7 Therefore, public health impact and the
probability of a spread of the virus at a community level
currently remain low.
Conclusion
In summary, a higher likelihood at the moment is imported
cases who have acquired the infection in mainland China.
The risk of disease widely spreading in Taiwan via humans in
the near future is considered low. Currently, information on
the animal reservoir of the viruses and the mode oftransmission between animals and humans remains limited.
We recommended that any suspected case of H7N9 infec-
tion, listed as a Category V Notifiable Infectious Disease,
should be reported immediately to Taiwan CDC.8 Addi-
tionally, we reminded physicians to reinforce inquiries
about patients’ travel and contact history in order to
facilitate the diagnosis of H7N9 infection and notify health
authorities immediately regarding any suspected cases to
assist implementation of subsequent measures that can
prevent further transmission of the disease. Continued
vigilance is essential to monitor variation of H7N9 and other
influenza viruses and regularly update estimates of the risks
associated with this virus.Acknowledgments
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